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Abstract
As shown by Peleg, the core of market games is characterized by nonemptiness, individual
rationality, superadditivity, the weak reduced game property, the converse reduced game
property, and weak symmetry. It was not known whether weak symmetry was logically
independent. With the help of a certain transitive 4-person TU game it is shown that weak
symmetry is redundant in this result. Hence the core on market games is axiomatized by
the remaining ﬁve properties, if the universe of players contains at least four members.
In this note we solve an open problem of the theory of cooperative games which arises in a natural
way in the context of the characterization of the core of market games due to Peleg ([1],[2]).
Theorem 2 of [2] shows that the core of market games is characterized by nonemptiness (NE),
individual rationality (IR), superadditivity (SUPA), the weak reduced game property (WRGP),
the converse reduced game property (CRGP), and weak symmetry (WS). (Precise deﬁnitions of
properties are recalled below.) The assertion without the assumption of WS was formulated in
[1], but it turned out that WS, which is a weak variant of anonymity, was needed in addition
in the proof of the uniqueness part. The problem whether WS is logically independent was
mentioned in [2]. With the help of a “cyclic” 4-person game (its symmetry group is generated
by a cyclic permutation) we show that the core of market games is characterized by NE, IR,
SUPA, WRGP, and CRGP (see Theorem 3). Thus, WS is redundant.
We adopt the notation of [1]. Let U be a set of players satisfying |U| ≥ 4, let us say M :=
{1,2,3,4} is contained in U. A (cooperative TU) game is a pair (N,v) such that ∅ 6= N ⊆ U is
ﬁnite and v : 2N → I R, v(∅) = 0. For any game (N,v) let
X∗(N,v) = {x ∈ I RN | x(N) ≤ v(N)} and X(N,v) = {x ∈ I RN | x(N) = v(N)}
denote the set of feasible and Pareto optimal feasible payoﬀs (preimputations), respectively. The
core of (N,v) is given by
C(N,v) = {x ∈ X∗(N,v) | x(S) ≥ v(S) ∀S ⊆ N}.
∗The ﬁrst author was partially supported by the Edmund Landau Center for Research in Mathematical Analysis
and Related Areas, sponsored by the Minerva Foundation (Germany).
†Also at the Institute of Mathematical Economics, University of Bielefeld. Email: petersud@math.huji.ac.il
‡Email: pelegba@math.huji.ac.ilA game is balanced, if its core is nonempty, and totally balanced, if every subgame is balanced.
A solution σ on a set Γ of games associates with each game (N,v) ∈ Γ a subset of X∗(N,v).
Let θ denote the set of all totally balanced games.
Let σ be a solution on a set Γ of games. σ satisﬁes nonemptiness (NE), if σ(N,v) 6= ∅ for
every (N,v) ∈ Γ. σ is covariant under strategic equivalence (COV), if for (N,v),(N,w) ∈ Γ
with w = αv + β∗ for some α > 0,β ∈ I RN the equation σ(N,w) = ασ(N,v) + β holds. Here,
(N,β∗) is the inessential (additive) game given by β∗(S) =
P
i∈S βi. In this case the games v
and w are called strategically equivalent. σ is individually rational (IR), if xi ≥ v({i}) holds for
every (N,v) ∈ Γ, for every x ∈ σ(N,v), and for every i ∈ N. σ is superadditive (SUPA), if
σ(N,v) + σ(N,w) ⊆ σ(N,v + w), when (N,v),(N,w),(N,v + w) ∈ Γ. Let (N,v) be a game,
x ∈ X∗(N,v), and ∅ 6= S ⊆ N. The reduced game (S,vx,S) with respect to S and x is deﬁned
by vx,S(∅) = 0, vx,S(S) = v(N)−x(N \S) and vx,S(T) = maxQ⊆N\S v(T ∪Q)−x(Q) for every
T 6= ∅,S. σ satisﬁes the weak reduced game property (WRGP), if (S,vx,S) ∈ Γ and xS ∈ σ(S,vx,S)
for every (N,v) ∈ Γ, for every S ⊆ N with 1 ≤ |S| ≤ 2, and every x ∈ σ(N,v). Here xS denotes
the the restriction of x to S. σ satisﬁes the converse reduced game property (CRGP), if for every
(N,v) ∈ Γ with |N| ≥ 2 the following condition is satisﬁed for every x ∈ X(N,v): If, for every
S ⊆ N with |S| = 2, (S,vx,S) ∈ Γ and xS ∈ σ(S,vx,S), then x ∈ σ(N,v).
Remark 1 It is well-known (see, e.g., [1]) that the core satisﬁes IR, SUPA, CRGP, and COV
on every set Γ of games. Moreover, it satisﬁes NE and WRGP on θ.
The 4-person game (M,u), deﬁned by
u(S) =

    
    
0 , if S ∈ {M,{1,2},{2,3},{3,4},{4,1},∅} ,
−1 , if |S| = 3 ,
−4 , otherwise ,
will be used in the proof of Theorem 3. Note that the symmetry group of (M,u) is generated by
the cyclic permutation, which maps 1 to 2, 2 to 3, 3 to 4, and 4 to 1; thus the game is transitive.
(A game is called transitive, if its symmetry group is transitive.)
Remark 2 (1) The core of (M,u) is the line segment with the extreme points (−1,1,−1,1)
and (1,−1,1,−1), i.e.,
C(M,u) = {(γ,−γ,γ,−γ) ∈ I RM | −1 ≤ γ ≤ 1}.
Indeed, every member xγ := (γ,−γ,γ,−γ) ∈ I RM with −1 ≤ γ ≤ 1 of this line segment
belongs to the core. On the other hand, every core element assigns zero to M and, thus,
to the members of the partitions {{1,2},{3,4}} and {{2,3},{4,1}}. Therefore the core
is contained in the line {xγ | γ ∈ I R}. The facts xγ({1,2,3}) < −1 ∀γ < −1 and
xγ({2,3,4}) < −1 ∀γ > 1 show that the core has the claimed shape.
(2) Let x = xγ ∈ C(M,u). Then the reduced coalitional function w := ux,{1,2} is given by
w({1}) = maxQ⊆{3,4} u({1} ∪ Q) − x(Q) = u({4,1}) − x4 = γ,
w({2}) = maxQ⊆{3,4} u({2} ∪ Q) − x(Q) = u({2,3}) − x3 = −γ,
w({1,2}) = u(M) − x({3,4}) = 0, and w(∅) = 0,
2thus ({1,2},w) is an additive game. Similarly it can be shown that all 2-person reduced
games are additive. Note that the restriction of x to any 2-person coalition is the unique
member of the core of the corresponding additive 2-person reduced game.
(3) The restrictions of the vectors xγ for γ = 1 and γ = −1, respectively, to the coalitions
{1,2,4},{2,3,4} and {1,2,3},{1,3,4}, respectively, show that the 3-person subgames are
balanced. All 1- and 2-person subgames are balanced as well. We conclude that (M,u) is
totally balanced.
Theorem 3 There is a unique solution on θ that satisﬁes NE, IR, SUPA, WRGP, and CRGP,
and it is the core.
Proof: By Remark 1 the core satisﬁes the desired properties. Let σ be a solution that satisﬁes
the desired properties. By Lemma 4.2 of [1] the solution is a subsolution of the core. Let
(N,v) ∈ θ, x ∈ C(N,v) and put n := |N|. It remains to show Lemma 4.10 of [1], i.e.
C(N,v) ⊆ σ(N,v). (1)
The cases n = 1 and n ≥ 3 of the proof of Lemma 4.10 can be copied: If n = 1, then x ∈ σ(N,v)
by NE and IR. If n ≥ 3 and (1) is shown for 2-person games, then xS ∈ C(S,vx,S) and (S,vx,S) ∈ θ
for every S ⊆ N with |S| = 2, because the core satisﬁes WRGP. Hence xS ∈ σ(S,vx,S) for every
S ⊆ N with |S| = 2. By CRGP, x ∈ σ(N,v). It remains to prove (1) for n = 2. Without loss of
generality we may assune N = {1,2}. Two cases can be distinguished.
(1) If (N,v) is additive, then the proof is ﬁnished by NE and IR (see Corollary 4.5 of [1]).
(2) If (N,v) ∈ θ is not additive, then v(N) > v({1}) + v({2}). Hence (N,v) is strategically





−2 , if |S| = 1 ,
0 , if S = ∅,N ,







2 ) ∈ I RN yields α > 0 and v = αw + β∗. Put
y :=
x−β
α and observe that y ∈ C(N,w) by COV of the core. We ﬁrst prove y ∈ σ(N,w).
With γ := y1/2 the vector y can be expressed as y = (2γ,−2γ). Moreover, −1 ≤ γ ≤ 1
holds, because y ∈ C(N,w). Let π be the permutation of M which exchanges 1 and 2 and
let (M,πu) be the “permuted” game given by (πu)(S) = u(π−1(S)). Remark 2 (1) yields
xγ,x−γ ∈ C(M,u) and, similarly, πx−γ = (γ,−γ,−γ,γ) ∈ C(M,πu). An application of
CRGP shows that xγ ∈ σ(M,u) and πx−γ ∈ σ(M,πu) holds true by Remark 2 (2) and
part (1) of the present proof. SUPA implies z := (y,0,0) = xγ + πx−γ ∈ σ(M,u + πu).
WRGP yields y ∈ σ (N,(u + πu)z,N). The reduced coalitional function b u := (u + πu)z,N
coincides with w. Indeed, b u(N) = (u + πu)(M) − z({3,4}) = 0 = w(N) by deﬁnition of
the reduced game. Moreover, the unique 2-person coalitions S with u(S) = (πu)(S) = 0
are {1,2} and {3,4}, thus (u+πu)({i,j}) = −4 holds true for i ∈ N and j ∈ M \N. This
observation directly implies
b u({i}) = (u + πu)({i,3,4}) − z({3,4}) = −2 = w({i}) for i = 1,2,
3thus y = zN ∈ σ(N,w).
In order to show x ∈ σ(N,v) we can proceed similarly. Only the coalitional functions u












. The proof is ﬁnished
by COV of the core. q.e.d.
Examples 5.1, 5.3. 5.4, 5.5 of [1] show that each of the axioms NE, SUPA, WRGP, CRGP is
logically independent of the remaining axioms. Example 5.2 contains a misprint. The solution
which only diﬀers from the core inasmuch as it assigns to any 1-person game the set of all feasible
payoﬀs, satisﬁes all axioms of Theorem 3 except IR.
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